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Side-Information Coding with Turbo Codes and its
Application to Quantum Key Distribution
Kim-Chi Nguyen, Gilles Van Assche, and Nicolas J. Cerf
Abstract— Turbo coding is a powerful class of forward error
correcting codes, which can achieve performances close to the
Shannon limit. The turbo principle can be applied to the
problem of side-information source coding, and we investigate
here its application to the reconciliation problem occuring in a
continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol.
Index Terms— Distributed source coding, turbo principle, rec-
onciliation, quantum secret key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Side-Information Source Coding
Given a source of two correlated random variables X and
Y , the minimal achievable rate of encoding of X is H(X |Y )
when Y is given losslessly to the decoder. Surprisingly,
this rate is also achievable when Y is known only to the
decoder, not to the encoder [1]. In this setting, Y is called
the side information and the encoding of X is known as side-
information source coding.
The construction of efficient side-information source coding
schemes is a difficult problem [2]. Recently, turbo codes have
shown to be good candidates for this coding application [3].
B. The Turbo Principle
Turbo coding was first introduced in 1993 by Berrou et
al. [4]. Since then it has been intensively studied and has
proved to approach the Shannon limit closer than any other
known forward error correcting code. The efficiency of the
turbo codes is due to the use of an iterative process at the
decoder side and the presence of an interleaver at the encoder
side, which adds randomness-like effect to the code.
Our motivation for studying side-information coding in
general, and turbo codes specifically, is described next.
C. Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD), also called quantum
cryptography, allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to share a
secret key that can be used for encrypting messages using a
classical cipher, e.g., the one-time pad. The main interest of
such a key distribution scheme is that any eavesdropping is, in
principle, detectable as the laws of quantum mechanics imply
that measuring a quantum state generally disturbs it.
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To share a secret key, a few steps must be performed.
First, quantum states are sent from Alice to Bob, or vice-
versa, on the so-called quantum channel. This process gives the
two parties correlated random variables, XA and XB . Then,
using a classical public authenticated channel, Alice and Bob
compare a sample of the transmitted data, from which they
can determine an upper bound on the amount of information
a possible eavesdropper may have acquired. Finally, they distill
a common secret key K , which is conventionally a function
of XA.
Secret key distillation [5] usually involves two steps. In
the first step, called reconciliation, Alice and Bob exchange
information over the public authenticated channel in such a
way that Bob can recover XA knowing XB . The exchanged
information is considered known to an eavesdropper. The sec-
ond step consists in applying a privacy amplification protocol
[6] to wipe out the enemy’s information on both quantum and
classical transmissions, at the cost of a reduction in the key
length. This reduction is roughly equal to the number of bits
known to an eavesdropper [6].
It thus appears clearly that reconciliation should not give
more information than necessary on XA, otherwise resulting in
a penalty in the key length. Hence, the interest of investigating
the use of (efficient) turbo coding in this context.
D. Problems with Interactive Reconciliation
An additional motivation for using turbo codes in the scope
of QKD lies in that reconciliation is traditionally performed
using interactive protocols, such as Cascade [7]. While they
are perfectly suited to discrete QKD protocols, such as BB84
[8], they suffer from both practical and fundamental problems
when used for continuous-variable QKD protocols [9]. For a
given number of reconciliation bits transmitted from Alice to
Bob, interactive protocols impose an additional penalty on the
key length over one-way protocols, due to the information
leaked from the reconciliation bits originating from Bob.
Furthermore, the evaluation of this leaked information depends
on the particular eavesdropping strategy, which rules out the
use of this method when no assumption on the enemy’s side
may be made. More details are given in Sec. III.
Replacing interactive reconciliation protocols by efficient
side-information coding is thus another strong motivation for
studying this application of turbo coding.
II. TURBO CODING WITH SIDE INFORMATION
A. Turbo Encoder and Turbo Decoder
A turbo encoder is a parallel concatenation of two, or more,
constituent codes separated by one, or more, interleavers. The
2constituent codes are usually two identical recursive systematic
convolutional codes. The input sequence to be encoded is
divided into blocks of length N . Each block is encoded by the
first encoder and interleaved before passing through the second
encoder. In channel coding, the systematic output of the first
encoder, along with the parity check bits of both encoders are
transmitted through the channel. Such a scheme usually uses
rate half constituent encoders, so the overall rate is one third.
The rate can be increased by puncturing a fraction of the parity
bits.
The turbo decoder consists of two, or more, Soft-In Soft-Out
(SISO) maximum likelihood decoders. Those decoders operate
in parallel, passing extrinsic information to one another in an
iterative way. The error rate is lowered after each iteration but
the gain in bit error rate decreases as the number of iterations
increases, so for complexity reasons the decoder typically
performs between 6 and 20 iterations.
Two families of decoding algorithms are commonly used
in turbo decoding: Soft Output Viterbi Algorithms (SOVA)
and Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) algorithms. The MAP
algorithm [10] is more efficient but more complex than the
SOVA. However, simplified versions of this algorithm such as
MAX-Log-MAP and Log-MAP perform almost as well with
a reduced complexity.
B. Application to Side-Information Source Coding
In the turbo coding principle, the systematic output of the
first component encoder is sent through the channel together
with the parity bits from the two encoders. Turbo coding can
be used for side-information source coding if we consider the
input bit sequence as the random variable X , the systematic
output of the channel as the side information Y , and the parity
bits from the two encoders as the information provided to
recover X from Y .
Thus, in practice, Y is a noisy version of X that is known by
the receiver, X is encoded with a turbo encoder by the emitter
but only the parity bits are transmitted, and the receiver uses
those parity bits and Y to recover X by turbo decoding. To
achieve a transmission rate close to the Slepian-Wolf limit, an
appropriate puncturing pattern must be used to transmit only
a fraction of the produced parity bits.
III. RECONCILIATION FOR CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE QKD
Gaussian-modulated QKD protocols using coherent states
have shown to deliver higher secret bit rates than those based
on single photons while using standard telecom optical com-
ponents [9]. Since they produce continuous variables (i.e., XA
and XB are correlated Gaussians), a reconciliation procedure
adapted to this situation must be used. We here assume that
the variable XA is converted into bits, as described in [11]
and implemented in [9].
Without going into the details, each instance of XA is
transformed into m bits, makingm l-bits strings {Si}i∈{1...m},
each called a slice, when a run of the QKD protocol produces
l instances of Gaussian variables. These ml bits will serve as
input to the privacy amplification protocol. On his side, Bob
needs to determine Alice’s bit values. For this, he calculates his
best estimate of Si given the l values of XB, thus producing
the l-bit string S˜i for each i. (1) Using a binary reconciliation
protocol, Bob then recovers Si given his knowledge of S˜i.
Even though we started from continuous variables, we thus
reach a situation where Alice and Bob need to reconciliate the
binary string Si, given that Bob knows the correlated binary
string S˜i. The two strings are related by the error rate ei,
that is the probability that a bit of Si is not equal to the
corresponding bit in S˜i. Overall, the reconciliation produces
H(S1...m) uniform bits by disclosing
∑
i=1...m
f(ei) bits, with
f(e) the number of bits needed to encode a l-bit string given
that the decoder knows a correlated string with bit error rate
e. The net result is thus H(S1...m)−
∑
i=1...m
f(ei).
A. Binary Reconciliation
Let us discuss the different options for the binary reconcili-
ation of a given slice with error rate e. Of course, it is always
possible to encode S using l bits, so that f(e) ≤ l.
Using a interactive reconciliation protocol such as Cascade
[7] implies that Alice and Bob exchange parities of various
subsets of their strings. After running Cascade, Alice and Bob
have disclosed RS and RS˜ for some binary matrix R of size
d × l. They thus have communicated the parities calculated
over d identical subsets of bit positions. The matrix R and
the number d of disclosed parities are not known beforehand
but are the result of the interactive protocol, depending on the
diverging parities encountered. For Cascade, d ≈ l(1+ξ)h(e),
where h(e) = −e log e−(1−e) log(1−e) and ξ is some small
overhead factor ξ ≪ 1.
In the case of balanced bit strings (i.e., the probabilities of
0 and 1 are the same), the parities RS give Eve d bits of
information on S, but RS˜ does not give any extra information
since it is merely a noisy version of RS, or stated otherwise,
S → RS → RS˜ is a Markov chain.
However, in the more general case where we need to take
into account that Eve gathered in E some information on
both S and S˜ by eavesdropping on the quantum channel,
S|E → RS|E → RS˜|E does not necessarily form a Markov
chain. Instead, the actual number of bits disclosed during
reconciliation, namely I(RS,RS˜;S|E), must be explicitly
evaluated. This quantity is in general larger than d, therefore
adding an extra cost due to interactivity.
Furthermore, it is unfortunately impossible to evaluate this
quantity without making an assumption on the eavesdropping
strategy, since we need to explicitly express the variable E.
In [9], this quantity was calculated for the most general
assumption within the scope of that paper (i.e., assuming any
individual Gaussian eavesdropping strategy). However, beyond
this assumption, the calculation loses its validity.
To remove any assumption, a possibility is to upper bound
the number of disclosed bits as if both parties disclosed
independent information, that is, I(RS,RS˜;S|E) ≤ 2d ≈
2l(1+ ξ)h(e). This is unfortunately too expensive in practice,
1Actually, the slices are corrected sequentially, for i = 1 . . .m, so that
the estimation of S˜i can also depend on the knowledge acquired from the
previous corrected slices Sj , j < i [11].
3except when e is small, and causes the secret key rate to vanish
if this worst-case measure is taken for all slices.
Another option for reconciliation is of course to use side-
information source coding, as we will do in Sec. IV. This
provides a non-interactive reconciliation protocol that has the
advantages of being independent of the eavesdropping strategy
and free of interactivity cost.
IV. APPLICATION TO AN EFFICIENT QKD PROTOCOL
A. Settings
We used a turbo code as a binary reconciliation protocol in
the continuous-variable QKD protocol described in [9].
The component encoders are two 16-state duo-binary recur-
sive systematic convolutional encoders with generator poly-
nomials (23, 35) [12]. The interleaver is a variation of the
odd/even interleaver presented by Barbulescu [13]. Our inter-
leaver separates the information bits into two groups: group 1
contains bits whose corresponding parity bits have been sent
and group 2 contains bits whose corresponding parity bits have
been punctured. The two groups are interleaved separately in
a pseudo-random manner. Then, the bits are rearranged so
that when the second component encoder computes his parity
bits, those corresponding to bits from group 1 are punctured
in priority, and vice versa. This procedure prevents us from
transmitting the two parity bits from one bit, while another bit
has none of his parity bits transmitted. The puncturing pattern
depends on the estimated error rate and is chosen to minimize
the number of bits sent to Bob.
The decoding algorithm is the Log-MAP algorithm, which is
similar to the MAP algorithm but operates in the log-domain.
We applied a scheme proposed by Fujii et al. [14], which
consists of weighting the extrinsic information exchanged by
the two decoders by a factor depending on whether or not
the corresponding parity bit has been received for this bit. We
performed 18 iterations with block size N = 10000.
B. Results
Each binary string Si was reconciliated using one of the 3
following strategies, depending on the estimated error rate ei:
• if ei > 15%, the string was completely revealed, disclos-
ing l bits of information,
• if ei < 0.8%, an interactive error correction protocol
(Cascade) was preferred and the number of disclosed bits
was counted independently for Alice and Bob,
• otherwise, the turbo coding scheme described above was
used.
In Table I, our results are compared with those of [9]
based on the use of reverse reconciliation with estimate of
the interactivity cost under assumptions. An example of the
processing of each slice is given in Table II. For higher losses,
the gain on the interactivity cost more than compensates for
the higher number of parity bits revealed by a turbo code.
V. CONCLUSION
We have shown that decoupling reconciliation and eaves-
dropping analysis in continuous-variable QKD protocols by
Modulation Losses Results from [9] Cascade and Turbo
Variance (dB) rate (kbs−1) Code rate (kbs−1)
41.7 0 1690 1605
38.6 1.0 470 450
32.3 1.7 185 209
27 3.1 75 81
TABLE I
Net secret key rate with modulation frequency of 800 kHz.
Slice Estimated Binary Correction Bits Shannon Limit
Number BER ei (%) Protocol Disclosed h(ei)
1 49.68 Full disclosure l 0.99
2 34.89 Full disclosure l 0.93
3 6.38 Turbo code 0.46l 0.34
4 0.02 Cascade 2× 0.005l 0.0027
5 6× 10−12 Cascade 2× 0.004l 3× 10−10
TABLE II
Disclosed bits for each slice, corresponding to the 2nd row of Table I.
using turbo codes allows close, if not better, results than by
using Cascade and an evaluation of interactivity costs under
assumptions. Furthermore, this opens the way to enhancing
the secret key rate for lossy (long-distance) transmissions, for
which the interactivity seems to play a critical role.
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